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Abstract 
The thrust of this study was to investigate the factors that motivate women microcredit borrowers in the Upper 
East Region of Ghana to take multiple loans from microfinance institutions. The study employed the double 
hurdle estimation method and the data was collected from 500 women engaged in agro-processing of whom 250 
were beneficiaries of multiple loans and 250 non-beneficiaries.  
The results showed that the set of factors that impacted the decision to borrow are among the factors that 
impacted the decision to go for multiple loans from microfinance institutions though the directions of the impact 
were found to be different for the two decisions. Thus, the number of people in household and number of friends 
with loans have positive impact on the decision to borrow; however, these variables have negative impact on the 
decision to go for multiple loans. It was also found that women who relinquished their loans to their spouses and 
women who took permission from their spouses before they could borrow had less multiple loans.  Again, 
respondents who were living below the poverty line (poor) had less multiple loans than their counterparts who 
were not poor. 
 The conclusion drawn is that, intra-household decision making and power play in male dominant households 
prevent women from taking multiple loans no matter how beneficial these loans may be for the women and their 
households. In view of this, it is recommended that gender mainstreaming should be included in the services of 
microfinance institutions to encourage women participation in household decision making. Again microfinance 
institutions should devote a percentage of their loan portfolio to targeting the poor. 
Keywords: Oliver Twists, Women, microcredit, power-play, double-hurdle and Ghana 
 
1. Introduction 
It has been argued that, the theory underlying the promotion of microfinance is due to market failure.  
Accordingly, the reason lies with the reluctance of many commercial financial intermediaries, such as banks, to 
advance relatively small loans to large numbers of poor people. This is because poor people are often deemed as 
unbankable (Bowles et al., 2006; Khan, 2008).  
 
In the light of this, poor people frequently rely on friends or family or private money lenders as their principal 
sources of credit, with the private money lenders usually charging usury rates. However, the inability of both the 
formal (banks) and informal (money lenders) private commercial sector to meet the financial demands of poor 
people, has beckoned other microfinance providers such as NGOs into the microfinance industry (Khan, 2008).  
  
The call by The 1997 Microfinance Summit for the mobilization of US$20 billion over a ten year period to 
support microfinance also enhanced the growth of the microfinance industry. Therefore from 2004 to 2008 
microfinance enjoyed unprecedented growth in emerging markets.  For instance, at the end of 2009, the 
Microfinance Information Exchange was tracking 1,084 microfinance institutions (MFIs) that were serving 74 
million borrowers ($38 billion in outstanding loans) and 67 million savers ($23 billion in deposits)( 
Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc., 2009).  
 
A plethora of success stories on microfinance in the extant literatures have given hope to many poor people that 
access to microfinance can catapult them out of poverty. For instance, Remenyi and Quinones (2000); Morduch 
and Haley (2002); Khandker (2005); Gobezie and Garber (2007); Imai and Azam (2010); Imai, Arun and Annim 
European Journal of Business and Management                                                                                                                               www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1905 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2839 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.28, 2013 
 
117 
(2010); Ghalib, Malki and Imai (2011); Annim and Alnaa (2013) and more other studies have shown positive 
impact of microfinance on poverty reduction. 
The above antecedents created fertile grounds for the microfinance industry in developing countries including 
Ghana, to blossom. For instance, in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), as at 2007, Ghana was ranked the highest 
recipient (about US$186m) of development partner’s donor funding into microfinance (CGAP, 2008). Thus, 
many poor people now have access to microfinance institutions loans with several people borrowing multiple 
times from these microfinance institutions.  
Faruqee and Khalily (2011) described a household and an individual with more than one membership of a 
microfinance institution as household overlapping and membership overlapping respectively. This suggests that, 
these overlapping clients are multiple borrowers. It has often been asserted that multiple borrowers simply 
borrow from Paul to pay Peter. This has arisen because of intense competition among fast growing microfinance 
institutions who engage in reckless lending without suitable assessment of client’s credit absorption capacities 
and multiple memberships leading to over-indebtedness and defaults (Faruqee & Khalily, 2011).  
Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) stated that there is no well-known study that robustly shows any 
strong impacts of microfinance programmes on overlapping and that defaulting of loan is a cause of multiple 
borrowing. They also asserted that, Bolivia had suffered from overlapping problems because of intense 
competition among MFIs in the 1990s. Vogelgesang (2003) also found that Bolivia had suffered from 
overlapping problems coupled with economic crisis during 1996-2000 and that the quality of portfolios held by 
microfinance institutions deteriorated. 
However, Mukherjee (2010) estimates that 10.28% of all the clients in the study sample are multiple borrowers. 
The major finding of this study is that, multiple borrowers have a lower arrears rate than their single borrowing 
peers in the same branches and lower than the rate of the overall sample.  Majority of the multiple borrowers said 
they used the second loan for investment purposes and none reported repayment difficulties. Krishnaswamy 
(2007) examined the degree of multiple borrowing between microfinance institutions clients in a competitive 
state in India. A higher percentage of multiple borrowers said that gathering more credit was completely their 
voluntary decision and that, they used the second loan for investment purposes. The study also found equal or 
better repayment records of the multiple borrowers than that of single borrowers.  
In a study of rural women engaged in agro-processing in the Upper East Region of Ghana,    Alnaa (2013) found 
that respondents who receive loans at least three and four times, have higher weekly consumption expenditure on 
basic needs than those who receive loans at most two and three times respectively. The study concluded that 
multiple loans from microfinance institutions contribute positively to reducing household poverty among rural 
women engaged in agro-processing in that Region.    
For Faruqee and Khalily (2011), a number of factors account for this phenomena of multiple borrowing among 
clients; for supporting growth of a small business, client’s may require larger loans than that offered by a single 
microfinance providers; clients may need supplementary microloans to cope with any adverse shocks or for 
consumption in crisis period; in case of default, the client can take out a second loan for the repayment purposes; 
among others.  
In a survey of rural women engaged in agro-processing in the Upper East Region of Ghana in 2011, out of the 
250 beneficiaries of microfinance institution loans, 198 of them were multiple borrowers. One of the 
beneficiaries had actually borrowed 20 times over a period of 10 years, with a total amount of 2,700 Ghana 
Cedis borrowed over the ten year period. 
The Upper East Region is the second poorest region in Ghana with about 70% of the population being poor 
(Ghana Statistical Service, 2008). The region has over the years experienced the activities of microfinance 
institutions. These institutions targeted rural women who are engaged in various economic activities with the aim 
of helping them with loans and other financial services to boost their businesses. 
The Region is basically a patriarchal society, under such circumstances it can be inferred that women would 
have limited say on what goes around them. However this can be said to be dependent on power brokerage and 
the resourcefulness of the women. Therefore, it is not uncommon to find a considerable number of women who 
are resourceful and / or assertive. Current trends of community education and sensitisation on gender issues have 
further enlightened most women and men alike in the Region thereby giving these women much more socio-
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economic leverage. Trends in increasing single motherhood and female headed households in this Region 
indicate stresses on women and the need for them to engage in various livelihood activities in order to provide 
for the needs of their children and other dependants.   
Thus, it is common that most women would take advantage of microfinance institutions activities by signing up 
their programmes and as such benefit from the loans/microcredits provided by these institutions. These women 
over the years received multiple loans from various microfinance institutions which studies have shown that 
these multiple loans have helped the women reduce household poverty (Alnaa, 2013). However, it is still 
difficult to tell what factors motivate these women to take on multiple loans as there is no independent study 
which has explored this in the region. It is therefore, important to find out why some rural women choose to 
borrow microcredit from microfinance institutions, while others choose not to borrow at all.  Even more 
important it is to understand why borrowers play the proverbial Oliver Twist. Are there socio-cultural variables 
to be identified and addressed?  
 
2.0 Material and methods 
2.1 Data 
The study employed descriptive survey. The data for the study was obtained from both beneficiaries (treatment 
group) and non-beneficiaries (control group) of MFI loans in 2011 through a random survey of 500 women 
engaged in agro-processing in the Upper East Region of Ghana, of whom 250 were beneficiaries of microfinance 
while 250 were non-beneficiaries. Interview schedules were administered to the randomly selected respondents 
in a face-to-face interview. The questions included in the interview related to access to microfinance, initial 
savings, consumption expenditure on basic needs, the number of times one has taken loans from microfinance 
institution(s), the number of business activities the woman engages in at the moment, the value of output, value 
of assets and several other socio-demographic characteristics.   
 
2.2 Theoretical model specifications 
 
Following Teklewold, Dadi, Yami and Dana ( 2006), individual agro-processors are assumed to maximize 
expected utility according to a von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) utility function defined over wealth (W). 
When faced with a choice between two alternative decisions, the ith agro-processor compares the expected utility 
with the decision to borrow from a microfinance institution, ( )biEU W  to the expected utility with the decision 
not to borrow, ( )niEU W . While direct measurement of individual agro-processor’s perceptions and risk 
attitudes on borrowing are not available, inferences can be made for variables that influence the distribution and 
expected utility evaluation of borrowing. These variables are used as a vector 'X' of attributes of the choices 
made by agro-processor 'i' and εi is a random disturbance that arises from unobserved variation in preferences, 
attributes of the alternatives, and errors in optimization. Given the usual discrete choice analysis and limiting the 
amount of non-linearity in the likelihood function, EUbi(W) and EUni(W) may be written as: 
                                                
                                     ( )    bi b i biEU W Xα ε= +                                                         (1) 
 
                                   ( )    ni n i niEU W Xα ε= +                                                           (2) 
The difference in expected utility may then be written 
                           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ?       bi ni b i bi n i niEU W EU W X Xα ε α ε= + − +  
 
                           ( ) ( ) ?   ?b n i bi niXα α ε ε= +  
 
                               i iXα ε= +                                                                                            (3) 
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A preference for microcredit (to borrow) will result if ( ) ( )  ?   0bi niEU W EU W= > ; whereas, a 
preference for non-borrowing will be revealed if ( ) ( )  ?bi niEU W EU W=   < 0. 
The observed choice of borrowing or non-borrowing is hypothesized to be the end result of socio-economic 
characteristics of the agro-processors and a complex set of inter-decision preference comparisons made by agro-
processors. The empirical analysis permits the investigation of the decision whether or not to borrow from a 
microfinance institution and the conditional number of times one borrows if the initial decision to borrow was 
made. Several hypotheses can be derived on these two sets of decision - factors that affect the decision to borrow 
or not and factors that affect intensity of borrowing or the number of times one borrows. 
 
2.3 Econometric specification of double hurdle model 
 
A feature of binary or censored data models is that the process, which results in non-borrowing, is assumed to be 
the same as that which determines multiple borrowing or multiple loans (the intensity of borrowing).  Assuming 
a given agro-processor’s characteristic is known to have a positive effect on the intensity of borrowing, then a 
very high value of this characteristic would likely lead to the prediction of borrowing for such agro-processor. 
Though, such assumptions may turn out to hold, there is no reason to expect this apriori. A reason why such an 
assumption might fail is that, there may exist a proportion of the population of agro-processors who would out of 
principle, never borrow under any circumstances (Teklewold, Dadi, Yami & Dana, 2006). 
In principle, the decisions on whether to borrow and how many times to borrowing can be made jointly or 
separately (Berhanu & Swinton, 2003). The Tobit model is used to analyse under the assumption that the two 
decisions are affected by the same set of factors (Greene, 1993). In the double-hurdle model, on the other hand, 
both hurdles have equations associated with them, incorporating the effects of agro-processor's characteristics 
and other factors. Such explanatory variables may appear in both equations or in either of one. Most importantly, 
a variable appearing in both equations may have opposite effects in the two equations. The double-hurdle model, 
originally due to Cragg (1971), has been extensively applied in several studies such as Burton et al. (1996) and 
Newman et al. (2001). However, this model has been rarely used in the area of microcredit borrowing. 
The double-hurdle model is a parametric generalization of the Tobit model, in which two separate stochastic 
processes determine the decision to borrow and the number of times one borrows. The double-hurdle model has 
a decision to borrow (D) equation: 
 
                  
* *1 if 0 and 0 if 0
'
i i i
i i i
D D D
D Z Uα
= > 

= + 
                                                                    (4) 
D* being a latent variable that takes the value 1 if the individual agro-processor borrows and zero if otherwise, Z 
is a vector of household characteristics and α is a vector of parameters. The multiple borrowing or number of 
times one borrows (intensity of borrowing) (Y) has an equation of the following: 
                       
* 0 and * 0
0 otherwise
* '
i i
i
i i i
Y Y D
Y
Y X Vβ
 = > >
 
= 
 
= + 
                                                                         (5) 
Where Yi is the observed answer to the number of times of borrowing (intensity), X is a vector of individual’s 
characteristics and β  is a vector of parameters 
The error terms Ui and Vi are distributed as follows: 
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                                                                               (6) 
The log-likelihood function for the double-hurdle model is: 
          
' '
' '
0
1log L 1 ( ) ( )i i ii i
X Y X
n Z n Zβ βα α φ
σ σ σ+
      
−
= − Φ + Φ      
      
∑ ∑l l                     (7) 
Under the assumption of independency between the error terms Vi and Ui, the model (as originally proposed by 
Cragg, (1971)) is equivalent to a combination of a truncated regression model and a univariate probit model. The 
Tobit model, as presented above arises if  
                                     and .X Zβλ
σ
= =  
A simple test for the double-hurdle model against the Tobit model can be used. It can be shown that the Tobit 
log-likelihood is the sum of the log-likelihood of the truncated and the probit models. Therefore, one simply has 
to estimate the truncated regression model, the Tobit model and the probit model separately and use a likelihood 
ratio (LR) test. The LR-statististics can be computed using (Greene, 1993): 
                            [ ] 22 ( )T TR knL nL χΓ = − −l l                                                                   (8) 
Where LT=likelihood for the Tobit model; Lp= likelihood for the probit model; LTR= likelihood for the truncated 
regression model; and k is the number of independent variables in the equations. 
If the test hypothesis is written as 0 0:  and . H H
β βλ λ
σ σ
= ≠ will be rejected on a pre-specified significance 
level, if            2kχΓ f  
2.4 Empirical double hurdle model 
 
 
                 5
mfmany age depend lonsours frnsours output oldsav numacty
amtprof amtsav assets tkmony eff poor ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + + + + +
                        (9) 
 
Where mfmany  is the number of times an individual has borrowed from a microfinance institution,( intensity 
of borrowing) and has the features of Di and Yi* while ε is decomposable into iU  and iV  as in equations (4) 
and (5) respectively with independent variables appearing in both equations. 
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3.0 Results and Discussion 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Description Obs. Mean  S.Deviation 
Poor Poor (1/0) 437 0.212 0.409 
age   Age in years  437 39.951 11.659 
mfmany Number of times received loans   437 1.375 2.267 
depend Dependants in household 437 3.100          2.121 
frnsours Number of friends with loans 437 2.995          4.547 
hhppl    Number of people in household     437 7.032 7.032 
lonsours   Number of borrowing sources  437 1.062          0.381 
numacty Number of economic activities            437 1.245 1.123 
oldsav    Initial savings 457 98.99        133.70 
assets Value of physical assets                437 442.7      1040.8 
Output  Value of output 435  410.2  936  
Amtsav  Current savings 437 147  336  
tkmony Spouse or a male takes portion of loan(1/0) 436  0.19 0.40 
permhhh 
 
Needs permission from spouse to borrow(1/0) 436 0.60 0.517 
Source: Field Survey data, (2011) 
 
Table 1, shows the explanation and descriptive statistics of the data used for the analysis. Age, depend, edulev, 
numacty, lonsours, frnsours and hhppl are a set of household characteristics. Where age is number of years of 
the respondent, the mean age is given as 39.95 or approximately 40 years. About 94% of the respondents are 
within the age brackets of 20-60 years and 69% within the age group of 20-40 years. This suggests that majority 
of the respondents fall within the economically active group. The number of dependents in the respondent’s 
household is denoted by depend with a mean number of three (3) dependents. Also, hhppl denotes the number 
of people in the respondent’s household with a mean of about 7 people in each household. The variable frnsours 
denotes the number of friends of the respondent who have borrowed from an MFI. This measures the breadth of 
financial services in the community. The number of people in rural areas particularly the poor who are served by 
MFIs determine the breadth of financial services and as such the level of demand for the financial services. 
Also, lonsours measures the number of sources of borrowing that the respondent can actually borrow from 
within the community when in need of a loan. These sources include both formal (MFIs and Banks) and informal 
(friends, relatives and money lenders) institutions. Thus lonsours determines the number of these formal and 
informal financial institutions that the respondent can actually and confidently go to for a loan when in need.  
The value of assets owned by the respondents measured in Cedis is denoted by assets. The variable oldsav 
measures the initial financial resources or savings of the respondent before receipt of loan from a MFI or start of 
agro-processing business. 
Again, the variable numacty denotes the number of income generating activities that the respondent engages in 
as at the time of the study.  The variable tkmony, is a binary variable and takes the value 1 if the spouse or any 
male member of the household takes a portion of the loan gotten from a microfinance institution, otherwise 0. 
Due to male dominance, it is believed that many women who access microcredit relinquish the loans to their 
spouses or fathers-in-law or sons (Goetz & Gupta, 1996; Kabeer, 1998). 
 The variable permhhh is constructed as a binary variable. It takes the value 1 if the respondent must seek 
permission from her husband, household head or any male member in the household before she accesses a MFI 
loan, and 0 if otherwise. The mean of permhhh is given as 0.60, implying that about 60% of the respondents had 
to seek permission from their husband or a male member of the household before accessing a loan from an MFI.  
permhhh and tkmony measure intra-household decision making and power play in the household.  Output is 
measured as value added valued in Cedis. 
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Also the variable poor measure the poverty status of respondents. If a respondent lives below the calculated 
weekly poverty line of 14.41, then she is deemed as poor and takes the value of 1 and 0 if otherwise.  
Table 2 shows the results of the double hurdle estimation of intensity of borrowing (multiple borrowing). 
Column A shows the results of the first hurdle; a logit estimation of the decision to borrow or not, while column 
B indicates the results of the second hurdle; estimation of the number times one borrows after the first decision 
has been taken to sign up microfinance programmes. 
From column A of Table 2, the variables; number of friends with loans, the value of output, current savings, 
value of physical assets, spouse or a male taking a portion of loan, number of people in household and poor 
respondents are all statistically significant in determining the probability of an agro-processor borrowing from a 
microfinance institution. 
Table 2: Results of Double Hurdle Estimation intensity of borrowing 
  
   
 
Variables 
(A) 
Logit 
(B) 
Poisson  
   
age 0.0064    -0.0095*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0003) 
Dependants in household 0.119 0.0401*** 
 (0.0938) (0.0012) 
Number of borrowing sources -0.607 0.163*** 
 (0.402) (0.0078) 
Number of friends with loans  0.382*** -0.0093*** 
 (0.0725) (0.0007) 
Value of output -0.0014*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0004) (0.00001) 
Initial savings 0.000183 0.0007*** 
 (0.00121) (0.00002) 
Number of economic activities             0.0586 -0.158*** 
 (0.355) (0.0060) 
Current savings  0.0046*** -0.0002*** 
 (0.0015) (0.00001) 
Value of physical assets                0.0009** -2.33e-06  
   (0.0005) (1.58e-06) 
Spouse or a male takes portion of loan(1/0) 1.525*** -0.266*** 
 (0.400) (0.00673) 
Needs permission from spouse to borrow(1/0) 0.145 -0.162*** 
 (0.301) (0.00644) 
Number of people in household      0.156*  -0.054*** 
 (0.089) (.00159) 
Poor(1/0) 0.868* -0.459*** 
 (0.525) (0.0138) 
Constant -3.141*** 7.041*** 
 (1.067) (0.0201) 
Observations 435 435 
 
Source: computed from field survey data, (2011) 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses 
 
        *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The coefficient of number of friends with loans is 0.382 and is significant at 1%.  Thus an increase in the number 
of friends with loans increases the probability of an agro-processor also taking a loan from a microfinance 
institution. Again an increase in current savings, value of physical assets and number of people in the 
respondent’s household, increase the probability of the respondent borrowing from a microfinance institution 
and their coefficients are given as 0.046, 0.0009 and 0.156 respectively. However, an increase in the value of 
output decreases the probability of the respondent borrowing from a microfinance institution. This may be due to 
the fact that, as the value of output increases the respondents may be making enough profit from their sales and 
may therefore not need to borrow from a microfinance institution. 
The results again show that respondents who relinquish a portion of a loan to their spouse or any male member 
of the household are more likely to borrow from a microfinance institution than their counterparts who do not 
relinquish their loan to their spouse. Moreover, respondents who are poor are more likely to borrow from a 
microfinance institution than their counterparts who are not poor. 
From column B, all the variables except, value of physical assets, are statistically significant and at 1%. Thus, 
the age of the respondent has a negative impact on multiple borrowing or the number times one borrows. 
Number of dependents in household and number of borrowing sources however have positive impacts on 
multiple borrowing even though they are not significant in the first hurdle. 
Also, the number of friends with loans has a negative impact on multiple borrowing, though this variable has a 
positive impact on the probability of borrowing in the first hurdle. This is so because friends with loans may 
encourage their peers to also borrow initially, however, subsequent decisions as to whether to go in for more 
loans in the future may be decisions taken independent of friends’ influence. 
The value of output has a positive impact on multiple borrowing but it is negatively related to the decision to 
borrow. Initial saving also has a positive impact on multiple borrowing, while the number of economic activities 
engaged in by the respondent has negative impact on multiple borrowing, it is not significant in the first hurdle. 
As the one engages in more economic activities the tendency to go in for more loans reduces due to the fact that 
more profits would have been made and the proceeds invested in other activities hence its negative impact on 
multiple borrowing. This finding is contrary to Faruqee and Khalily (2011) which asserts that clients may need 
supplementary microloans to support growth of a small business. 
Again current savings has a negative impact on multiple borrowing but has a positive impact on the decision to 
borrow. In most microfinance programmes current saving is a prerequisite for loans, however, this may not be 
the case for subsequent loans to be contracted.  
The results again indicate that respondents whose spouse or any male member of the household takes a portion 
of her loan contracted, take on less multiple loans than their counterparts whose spouse do not take a portion of 
their loan but this variable has a positive impact on the probability of borrowing. The reason may be that 
respondents are unwilling to go in for more loans since they know their spouses are likely to take a portion of the 
loan while they are left with the difficulty of repaying the whole loan amount. Also respondents who must take 
permission from their spouse or any male member of the household take on less multiple loans. It can therefore 
be inferred that these two variables; spouse taking a portion of the loan and permission from spouse to borrow 
which measure intra-household decision making and power play have negative impacts on multiple borrowing.  
The number of people in the respondents’ household has a negative impact on multiple borrowing, but this is 
positive in the first hurdle. Also respondents, who are poor, living below the weekly poverty line of 14.41 Cedis, 
take on less multiple loans than their counterparts who are not poor. Poor people may have challenges of 
repaying their loans and for that matter may have poor credit rating. In such a circumstance they are unlikely to 
get multiple loans than their counterparts who are non-poor.    
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4.0 Conclusions and Policy recommendations  
The study sought to investigate the factors that motivate women microcredit borrowers to play the proverbial 
Oliver Twist, that is, take multiple loans from microfinance institutions. The study used the double hurdle 
estimation method and the results showed that, the number of dependents in the respondent’s household and the 
number of borrowing sources known to the respondent are motivating factors for multiple borrowing to the 
women. On the contrary respondents who relinquish their loans to their spouse, respondents who must 
necessarily seek permission from their spouse and respondents who are poor have no motivation to take multiple 
loans. 
It is therefore concluded that, intra-household decision making and power play in male dominant households if 
not well balanced, discourage women from taking multiple loans no matter how beneficial these loans may be 
for the women and their households. Again, poor people do not have the motivation to go in for multiple loans. 
This is so because of their poor credit rating. In the light of these, it is recommended that gender mainstreaming 
should be included in the services of microfinance institutions to encourage women participation in household 
decision making so as to give them more socio-economic leverage to engage in economic activities as long as 
they are beneficial to them. Again microfinance institutions should devote a percentage of their loan portfolio to 
targeting the poor so as to enable the poor access loans as many times as they can. 
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